Introduction
While we have addressed most of Mr. Kasper's theoretical points before, 1 we will respond again to his most recent article, ''Total Beta: A Capital Market Analysis with Empirical Evidence'' to eliminate any misconceptions. In order to see why Mr. Kasper's critique is mostly flawed and uses poor reasoning, we will succinctly illustrate by example the unsystematic risk issue/debate beyond the abstract and sometimes obtuse formulations that, unfortunately, have become status quo when debating Mr. Kasper.
Practical Illustration of the Unsystematic Risk/ Total Beta Issue
Let's assume that we have two otherwise identical owner-operator restaurants. They each have an FMV of $1 million prior to news of rerouting of a busy thoroughfare. The rerouting plan will either be Plan A or Plan B. Larry's GoodEats will be unaffected by the reroute. However, Pete's GoodEats' FMV will either be impacted in a very positive or a very negative manner, depending on where the road is ultimately built. The impact could go either way; experts place it at fifty-fifty odds as to where, A or B, the road will be built. The zoning commission will decide the fate of Pete's GoodEats in six months. The fair market value (FMV) of Pete's GoodEats after the decision will be as follows:
So, prior to the rerouting news, both restaurants had an FMV of $1 million. Subsequent to the news of the rerouting and prior to the decision of A or B, the probability weighted values of the restaurants are as follows:
Pete's GoodEats:
Larry's GoodEats:
According to beta and the capital asset pricing model (CAPM), the value of Pete's GoodEats will be unaffected by the news of the potential rerouting. In other words, the value allegedly is still $1 million. Why? The potential rerouting is unsystematic risk. Unsystematic risk is not priced in CAPM world. Mr. Kasper's critiques literally say that immediately after the extremely volatile news (for only Pete's GoodEats), the FMV of Pete's GoodEats is still equal to Larry's GoodEats. Of course in the real world of small business businesses and imperfectly diversified owners, this is not the case; market participants for small owner-operator businesses are risk averse and would, of course, discount the expected value of Pete's GoodEats very dramatically. Total beta (TB) is designed for the market for small, privately held companies where unsystematic risk is priced. On the other hand, CAPM makes assumptions, which, as the previous illustration shows, are not reliable for the pricing of small, privately held businesses.
If one needs more formal evidence that real-world entrepreneurs, contrary to (Mr. Kasper's) CAPM, are driven by unsystematic risk, we employ the research found in two recent papers that specifically address this issue. Both of these papers conclude that the entrepreneur is substantially (unsystematic) risk averse.
In Entrepreneurial Finance and Non-Diversifiable Risk, the paper states the following:
''Entrepreneurial investment opportunities are often illiquid and non-tradable. Entrepreneurs cannot completely diversify away project-specific risks for reasons such as incentives and information asymmetry. Therefore, the standard law-of-one-price based valuation/capital structure paradigm in corporate finance cannot be directly applied to entrepreneurial finance. In addition to compensation for systematic risks, the entrepreneur also demands a sizable premium for bearing idiosyncratic risks, which increase with his risk aversion, his equilibrium inside ownership, and the project's idiosyncratic variance. '' 3 In the Investment, Idiosyncratic Risk, and Ownership paper, the authors state:
''High-powered incentives may induce higher managerial effort, but they also expose managers to idiosyncratic risk. If managers are risk averse, they might underinvest when firmspecific uncertainty increases, leading to suboptimal investment decisions from the perspective of well-diversified shareholders. We empirically document that, when idiosyncratic risk rises, firm investment falls, and more so when managers own a larger fraction of the firm.'' 4 Now, we turn to Mr. Kasper's theoretical or philosophical criticisms. # Sellers set asking prices based on a multitude of factors. Some of those factors presumably are an estimate of FMV plus a premium based on some uncertainty of that estimate plus an additional psychological/negotiation premium so the buyer can feel good about negotiating a discount to the asking price. This, of course, has nothing to do with who sets the price or, more importantly, whether unsystematic risk matters and is priced.
# Importantly, the data shown by Mr. Kasper are perfectly consistent with the observation that both buyers and sellers of privately held companies are not fully diversified. His new ''empirical'' analysis, therefore, proves nothing and is disconnected to whether FMV (as opposed to asking price differences) is set by buyers or sellers. Further, since both buyers and sellers are not well diversified, his sellerside negotiating analysis is irrelevant.
& If you want to look at empirical data, simply look at the undisputable fact that the multiples are much lower for small, privately held businesses, and the implied and estimated returns are far greater than publicly traded equity historical returns. Most people attribute most of this difference to the fact that sellers and buyers of small, privately held businesses, unlike easily diversifiable publicly traded stocks, are not fully diversified and therefore incur far greater risk.
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N TB empirical evidence does not support using it to estimate ex-ante returns.
# Since investments in publicly traded equity securities are easily diversifiable (anyone can buy a few shares in each of 30 different public companies with substantial unsystematic/diversifiable risk and by so doing eliminate that risk), unsystematic risk is not rewarded/priced in public security markets, regardless if they have institutional following or not. 6 Therefore, publicly traded stock prices or returns (ex-ante or ex-post) will not be useful in terms of testing TB.
Considering he is such an advocate of CAPM and MPT, it seems rather contradictory for Mr. Kasper to allegedly use ''empirical evidence'' to refute TB. Mr. Kasper suggests that returns on publicly traded stocks are correlated with larger levels of diversifiable risks. He cites the small stock return as evidence. Here, Mr. Kasper is confusing correlation with causation-small stock premia are widely believed to be based on lower liquidity and/or the intertemporal flaw of the CAPM.
7 Size and correlated unsystematic risk merely correlate with these factors. None of the following, the CAPM, the Fama French three factor model, or any common version of the arbitrage pricing theory (APT) model, includes unsystematic variance as a pricing factor. What about empirical research? Richard Roll and Stephen A. Ross wrote ''An Empirical Investigation of the Arbitrage Pricing Theory'' in the Journal of Finance in December 1980. In this study, they found that company-specific risk (variance of return) was not priced in stock returns when measured together with (3 to 4) systematic risk factors. Indeed, they admitted that the APT model would have to be rejected if individual stock variance (''own'' standard deviation) of stock returns did cause higher returns, in that it would violate the efficient market hypothesis on which the APT is based. Please refer to any corporate finance textbook. Moreover, the most commonly accepted cost of equity (COE) model in academia is the Fama French three factor model. This model is based on extensive research that found that stock returns are best correlated with three factors. One of the factors is the size of the company. Even though company-specific risk (CSR) is highly correlated with stock returns, they do not include CSR as a factor. This is because with the inclusion of more than one factor in a statistical model, a variable such as CSR loses it predictive power-correlation does not prove causation. CSR ''covaries'' with other factors, and some other factors correlate better than CSR, so it's excluded from the model, similar to the Ross and Roll study conclusion.
The Total Beta Debate: A Real-World Analysis N TB implies more risk and higher returns than investors receive in privately held companies.
# Mr. Kasper complains that a total beta of 4.0, for instance, is too high to use for a privately held company, except for possibly a start-up venture. We admit public company total betas of 4.0, or more, are somewhat rare, unless, as shown, the company operates in one of the high-tech industries. More importantly, however, we estimate that the total beta for a typical privately held business is approximately 3.0, which is perfectly consistent with (typical) required returns of 17%-20%. Assuming TB jumped from 3.00 to 3.50 implies an increase in the range to 21-24.
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Conclusion
As our example shows, contrary to the theoretical MPT, unsystematic risk matters greatly. Appraisers need to understand that TB is a model-just like the build-up method (BUM) is a model, which qualitatively captures CSR. Having said that, all total beta proponents recognize that the technique is not ''perfect.'' We readily admit that there are some comparison issues between public and private companies, and, thus, subjectivity is still present.
We also acknowledge that the marginal sellers and investors may be partially diversified, 10 and, therefore, some of the observable premium correlation for small, privately held businesses shown herein may be related to other factors, such as reduced liquidity. Mr. Kasper consistently has critiqued TB on very narrow, theoretically abstract grounds without acknowledging, in practical terms, that the assumptions behind TB are quite reasonable. Namely, in the market for small, privately held businesses, investors and sellers are undiversified and price their actual risk proportionately the same as the diversified investors price their actual risk per CAPM. 9 We acknowledge that the marginal investors and sellers may be partially diversified, and therefore some of the observable premium correlation may be related to other factors, such as reduced liquidity. See article cited in footnote 5. Cost of equity 5 risk-free rate + TB 3 ERP. Lower end of range 5 3% + 3 3 6% 5 21%; upper-end of range 5 3% + 3.5 3 6% 5 24%. 
